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Introduction
Extended Sociality and the Social Life of Humans
Kenneth Sillander and Jon Henrik Ziegler Remme
This book explores the various ways in which humans are constitutively
enmeshed in ‘extended socialities’, socialities that extend into the nonhuman
domain and a virtual sphere beyond immediate relations between humans. It is
situated within ongoing debates in anthropology about the human condition
and human and more-than-human sociality. Going beyond contemporary
anthropological theories which challenge the notion of human exceptionalism –
the idea that humans are somehow fundamentally different from other beings –
the volume is concerned with the speciﬁcities of the human condition at the
same time as it situates humans within a broader ﬁeld of sociality.
Extending beyond the sphere of human consociates, this ﬁeld encompasses
the variety of living beings, objects and unseen agencies, as well as the ideas
and imaginaries, with or through which humans interact in the world within a
formative relational dynamic which shapes them as they partake in it. Span-
ning inquiries into sociality across various ﬁelds of human existence – from
cognition and conceptions of personhood through kinship, social organization
and political economy, to relations with the natural environment, spirits and
objects – the volume forms an ethnographically based inquiry into the rela-
tional constitution of human sociality. It explores the manifold worldly articu-
lations of sociality and how they condition and are conditioned by human
nature.
Humans Nevertheless
The origin of this book traces back to a seminar held in 2012 in honour of the
Norwegian anthropologist Signe Howell. Professor Howell, trained at the
University of Oxford, and a faculty member of the anthropology departments
at the University of Edinburgh (1983–1987) and University of Oslo (since
1987), has for decades been at the forefront of a wide range of anthropo-
logical debates on cosmology, personhood, kinship and, more recently, the
UN-led program for reducing carbon emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation. Her ground-breaking work on the Malaysian Chewong (Howell
1984), in which she described the perspectival differences in perceptions
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between humans and supernatural beings, foreshadowed the concept of
perspectivism of Viveiros de Castro (1998; see also Viveiros de Castro
2012), and through publications based on her later ﬁeldwork among the
Lio of Flores, Eastern Indonesia, and on transnational adoption in Norway,
she made signiﬁcant contributions to theoretical discussions about the rela-
tions between persons, things and spirits (1989a) and the nature of practice-
based kinship (2001; 2003).
Of central concern in all of Howell’s work has been a question which is
at the core of the anthropological enterprise: the nature of the anthropos,
what it is to be human. For her, addressing this question has involved a
two-directional inquiry into how human nature is constituted through social
relations and metaphysical principles, through sociality and ontology.
Through sociality, the human condition is fundamentally linked with that
which is ‘other’ to humans: nature, objects and nonhuman beings. For
example, in her classic monograph Society and Cosmos, Howell argued
that among the Chewong, the quality of having ruwai – vital principle and
consciousness – which humans share with what she termed ‘superhumans’
(spirits of sorts), moulds humans and superhumans ‘into one extended
society’ (1989b: 4), thus proposing that Chewong sociality by extends into
the superhuman domain. Similarly, in her work on exchange practices
among the Lio (1989a), she argued that the dead and spirits could be seen
as exchange partners, and that ‘things are incorporated in people’, thus
highlighting additional ways in which sociality is extended beyond living
humans, along with questioning the subject-object distinction between
humans and things.
However, Howell also stressed that this extension of sociality is by no
means unlimited, but constrained and given shape by the prescription of
rules and metaphysical principles, the breach of which may, in the Che-
wong case, entail the metamorphosis of humans into animals (2016). Soci-
ality may thus be extended beyond humans, but ‘the conditions for control
of this sociality lie embedded in their ontology and the particular concepts
of human nature that spring out of this’ (Howell 2012a: 144). Besides
acknowledging the extension of sociality beyond relations between humans,
Howell in this way argued for paying attention to how the shape of
sociality – and humans’ ontological status within it – is predicated on their
metaphysical understandings.
This volume takes its cue from Howell’s interest in the extension and
qualiﬁcation of human sociality. It explores ‘extended sociality’, in the
sense of a socality which goes beyond sociability and ongoing interaction
between human consociates to encompass nonhuman, distant, mediated,
virtual, disjunctive and unaffective interaction and forms of aggregating.
Through this concept, it examines how humans participate in and come into
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being through their diverse relations between and beyond themselves, and
how this is affected by distinct attributes of the human condition and their
emplacement in the world.
In so doing, this book bears directly on some prominent recent develop-
ments in anthropology and cultural theory associated with the posthumanist
and ontological turns, which have seriously challenged the notion of human
exceptionalism and undermined the conventional anthropological delimitation
of its object of study. By drawing in various ways on Howell’s work to explore
what it means to be human, and how the human relates to the nonhuman, the
contributors address imperative questions which have been brought to the fore
through these developments and by an upsurge of studies highlighting how
humans are ontologically co-constituted with the nonhuman, with animals,
other forms of beings, and objects and materials. However, through its twofold
interest in how humanity emerges from a sociality extending beyond immedi-
ate relations between human consociates, and in how distinct human qualities
moderate these relations and the conditions of human participation in them, the
book maintains a distinct focus. It examines the special characteristics that
separate human from nonhuman entities and condition the distinctive human
mode of engaging with the world through extended socialities.
Unlike some thinkers in the posthumanist camp, most contributors to this
book share with Howell an important caveat regarding the extension of
sociality beyond humans. In a recent critique of posthumanist approaches,
Howell emphasizes the fact that, even while humans, other beings in the
environment and objects inﬂuence each other, and may even, as she observes
for the Chewong, be bound up in a state of symbiosis, our ontological
knowledge and metaphysical reasoning are the result of interaction with our
most signiﬁcant social and cultural others. We cannot, she asserts, have any
meaningful dialogue with animals or objects, and the ‘informants’ in our
ﬁeldwork can never be anything other than other humans (Howell 2013:
110). By that she reafﬁrms the conventional anthropological focus on human
perspectives and emphasizes the fact that, even though humans may be
implicated in relational matrixes beyond humans, we are still humans and
understand and participate in these extended socialities as humans. Hence,
while we may ‘have never been only humans’, as some posthumanist theorists
may be inclined to claim (Pyyhtinen & Tamminen 2011), we are humans
nevertheless.
In the following we discuss how different varieties of anthropocentric
critique in contemporary anthropological theory have reopened questions
regarding the human condition and what consequences this has for the present
book and the study of human social relations. We then provide a genealogy of
previous theorizing of sociality in anthropology and position the concept of
extended sociality herein.
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Reclaiming Anthropos
After a period of relative dormancy within the discipline of anthropology, the
question of the human condition has re-emerged at the centre of anthropo-
logical debate with renewed urgency. In the current era – the Anthropocene – a
variety of empirical and analytical concerns have generated a surge of interest
in re-theorizing what it means to be human, and questioned the nature of the
relationship between the human and the nonhuman and related divisions such
as nature and culture, mind and matter, and subject and object. Examples of
such concerns are the consequences of the impact of human activity on climate
change and other environmental conditions, along with the development of
various life-sustaining and life-amending technologies, the proliferation of
biopolitics in Foucault’s (2008) sense and the increased awareness of how
human life and health depend on the myriad of microbiomes inhabiting our
bodies. Other empirical concerns, more to do with the cultural or technoscien-
tiﬁc rather than biological dimension of the expansion of human knowledge
and societal impact, relate to the multiplication and spread of new information
technologies and communication systems, the surfeit of ‘affect-based’ and
simulacric media and consumer cultures, and the development of spheres of
virtual existence and artiﬁcial intelligence. This has spurred a progeneration of
‘post-social relationships’ with nonhuman entities (Knorr-Cetina 1997) and the
emergence of new forms of ‘hybrid environments’ in Bruno Latour’s (1993)
terms, blending the extra-somatic and the organic, the cultural and the natural.
In anthropological theory, other, more primarily analytical concerns have at
the same time contributed to the same shift in orientation. Gradually evolving
in the aftermath of the high tides of culturalism and postmodernism, these most
importantly trace back to the ‘crisis of representation’ (Marcus & Fisher 1986),
the ensuing reﬂexive turn and subsequent crisis of disciplinary conﬁdence
associated with the loss of ethnographic authority, and a gradually increasing
disenchantment with culture and participant observation as privileged means
for understanding the other and the discipline in the globalized and postcolo-
nial world (e.g. Abu-Lughod 1991; Rabinow et al. 2008; Crapanzano 2010;
Rees 2010). This has generated a sense of an epistemological cul-de-sac and
incited anthropologists to look beyond ‘culture’ – itself often associated with
human exceptionalism – for new directions to overcome the impasse.
As a consequence, anthropology has been drawn towards engaging more
directly with the human condition, and the question of how our emplacement
in the more than human – and cultural – world affects it. This has entailed a
turn within the discipline towards a variety of bodies of theory – often notably
located or drawing their inspiration from outside the discipline – which to
varying degrees have been subsumed under the general label of posthumanism.
Prominent examples include actor-network theory (Latour 2005), material
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semiotics (Law 2009), companion species and ‘becoming with’ (Haraway
2008), multispecies anthropology (Kirksey & Helmreich 2010), ‘thing-theory’
(Henare et al. 2010), new materialism (Braidotti 1991; Barad 2003), affect
theory (Massumi 2002; Sedgwick 2003), and ‘neo-animism’ (Viveiros de
Castro 2007; Willerslev 2007; Descola 2013). In various ways, these
approaches all challenge assumptions of human self-containment or some
form of ﬁxed human essence, and foster a view that humans are continually
shaped, and deﬁned, through their relations to various others in a more-than-
human world.
One prominent anthropological example of these approaches, entailing
interest in extended sociality through a broadening of the boundaries of the
human, is the already mentioned perspectivism of Viveiros de Castro (1998;
2012). In Amerindian societies, Viveiros de Castro claims, the fundamental
division between humans and nonhumans is based on their bodily differences,
while humanity extends to all those capable of having a point of view, which
includes entities humans see as animals and other nonhuman beings. These
differences are far from static, and the different entities are all susceptible to
metamorphosis (see Remme, Chapter 3 in this volume). The relations between
humans and nonhumans are, Viveiros de Castro stresses, social relations, and
socialities thus extend beyond the human domain to include animals, who from
their own point of view are humans.
The extension of sociality beyond humans is also evident in what has
become known as multispecies ethnography. Anna Tsing’s (2013: 27) claim
that ‘the concept of sociality does not distinguish between human and non-
human. “More than human sociality” includes both’, and her related observa-
tion that ‘human nature is an interspecies relationship’ (cited in Kirksey,
Scheutze & Helmreich 2014: 4), evince an obvious attack on limiting sociality
to the human domain. Multispecies ethnography asserts that humans are from
the start and inexorably bound up in multispecies interrelations, and that
relations, whether among humans, between humans and nonhumans or beyond
humans, such as between fungi and trees (Tsing 2013), salmons (Lien 2015) or
microorganisms (Paxson 2014), are social through and through, sociality being
inseparable from life. To the same effect, Donna Haraway has drawn attention
to the fact that human genomes can be found in only about 10 per cent of all
the cells in the human body; the other 90 per cent are ﬁlled with the genomes
of bacteria, fungi and other microbioms, some of which are necessary for us to
be alive. Hence, to become human is always and already to ‘become with’
(Haraway 2008: 4), sociality beyond the human being constitutive of human
life itself.
Another branch of theory which highlights a condition of human embedd-
edness in socialities beyond humans is ‘affect theory’, a label for a range of
theorizations of diverse derivation which share an interest in visceral forces
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or bodily capacities beneath or outside of signiﬁcation, which are not
exclusive to humans (e.g. Massumi 2002; Sedgwick 2003; Thrift 2007).
Presented as critique of the ‘standpoint of singularity’ (Venn 2010), it
envisages affect as a ‘force of encounters’ (Seighworth & Gregg 2010: 2),
which may travel across individuals and bodily boundaries and link up
human subjects with other humans, nonhumans and objects through rela-
tions in the environing world which are constitutive of affect and to which
affect is inherent. In the inﬂuential lineage of affect theory from Spinoza,
Deleuze, Guattari and Massumi, affect emerges as ‘virtual synesthetic per-
spectives’ or ‘intensities’ potentiating action; while autonomous and pre-
subjective, affect in this understanding is inescapably social; it ‘escapes
conﬁnement in the particular body whose vitality, or potential for
interaction, it is’ (Massumi 2002: 35).
A similar stress on the extension of sociality beyond human subjects, albeit,
interestingly, expressly not restricted to non-representational and presubjective
inﬂuences, is notably evident in the innovative theory of one of the more
prominent ﬁgures in posthumanist anthropology, Eduardo Kohn (2013), who
approaches more-than-human interaction through non-symbolic – iconic and
indexical – modes of semiosis. ‘Nonhuman-life forms also represents the
world’, Kohn (2013: 8) claims and by that argues for an ‘anthropology beyond
the human’, which radically challenges the assumption of a constitutive and
exclusive interconnection between humans and representation.
By showing empirically and analytically how humans are always and
already entangled with others and ‘emerge’ through their relations, these and
other conceptualizations fall back on a long tradition of emphasizing the
relational aspects of the human condition, but go further by extending the ﬁeld
of the relations, pushing our understanding of the nature of those aspects.
The focus on the constitutional effects of relations in these approaches is
closely linked to an understanding of these effects as a product of practices,
which has diverse antecedents ranging from the pragmatist semiotic philoso-
phy of Charles Peirce, the speech act theories of John Austin and John Searle,
feminist and queer theories (Butler 1990) as well as the Deleuzian philosophy
of becoming. The resonances with pragmatist philosophy in these approaches
also point to a shift in these divisions of anthropological theorizing from
representations to ‘enactments’, and to the ontological effects of these. Inte-
grated into anthropological theory through concepts such as ‘performativity’
and ‘enactments’ (Mol 2002; Abram & Lien 2011), and the notion of ‘divi-
dual’ or relationally deﬁned personhood (Strathern 1988; 1996), human beings
are in these approaches ﬁrst and foremost deﬁned through their relational
practices.
These theoretical developments in important ways change the conceptual
framework for thinking about the implications of being human. Instead of
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talking about human beings, the network and practice-oriented posthumanist
approaches invite us, often with reference to Deleuze (1994; 2010), to think
humans as human becomings, and to recognize that such becoming is neces-
sarily a ‘becoming with’ (Haraway 2008), a relational process of coming into
being that always takes place in conjunction with other becomings, such as of
animals, plants or things. Calling thus for attention to a ‘more-than-human
sociality’ (Tsing 2013), these approaches encourage us to see humans as
entangled within a wider ﬁeld of sociality that extends beyond inter-human
relations, and includes everything affecting the ‘relational assemblages’ of
which they are a part, as well as to pay attention to how these relations are
formed through practice. Humans, then, as it has been claimed, have ‘never
been only human’ (Pyyhtinen & Tamminen 2011), their ‘being’ emerging only
through the ongoing enactment of integral, more-than-human relations. Or in
the words of Viveiros de Castro (2005: 155), who builds on Émile Benve-
niste’s pronominal theory, ‘“human” is not the name of a substance, ... but the
name of a relation, of a certain position in relation to other possible positions.’
As a consequence of this extension of relational assemblages that are seen to
constitute humans, these approaches challenge human exceptionalism. One
way in which this is done is through the detachment of agency from
intentionality. While traditional, ‘humanist’ notions of agency have retained
a close connection between humans, intentionality and agency, and corres-
pondingly been restricted to discussing its differential distribution among
humans, posthumanist accounts of agency, such as that of actor-network
theory, extends this distribution to various, living or non-living, entities (so-
called ‘actants’) from which inﬂuence in any given encounter between them
may emanate, intentional or not (Latour 2005; Law 2007). While the concept
of agency that tied it to intentionality ascribed an exceptional capacity to
humans, agency has now become ‘ﬂattened’ and desubjectiﬁed, a matter of
relational ‘affect’, which essentially occurs regardless of intentionality, and
inﬂuences humans more or less similarly to other beings.
Agency has thereby been transformed, to the extent that, in certain versions,
it is an attribute of neither subjects nor objects, but of ‘hybrid associations’ of
animate and inanimate entities in a multi-composite network (Latour 1993), or
located in the actual dynamics of material-discursive practices through which
entities reciprocally emerge, in a self-constitutive, immanent process which
Karen Barad (2003) calls ‘intra-activity’ or ‘intra-action’. This obvious distan-
cing from human exceptionalism places humans on par with a host of other
beings and entities, all of which are equally subjected to a continuous process
of mutual becoming.
This book engages with these ideas in a constructive but critical way. We
perceive that these developments have widened the scope for understanding
the condition of being human, and we support the efforts at extending the
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constitutive ﬁeld of relations in which humans are enmeshed. We recognize
that understanding this dynamics in the age of the Anthropocene, in which
human entanglement with nonhuman forces and conditions is increasingly
critical and experientially accessible, has become more pertinent than ever.
Having acknowledged that, however, we argue that we need to go further by
exploring what human becoming within this ﬁeld actually entails. Beyond
reiterating the observation of humans’ constitutive enmeshment – an under-
standing that would come close to being a form of relational reductionism – we
need to actually take seriously the related and equally celebrated, although not
equally elaborated, posthumanist point that this ﬁeld is composed of relations
between heterogeneous entities. Beyond simply recognizing the heterogeneity
of the many entities which in one way or another co-exist with and co-
constitute each other, we need to critically attend to how these entities contrib-
ute to and participate in this process in different ways. Thus the effacement of
human exceptionalism need not, and should not, entail the concurrent rejection
of human distinctiveness, any more than the distinctiveness of animals, mater-
ials, and so on.1
In conventional anthropological fashion, and as advocated by Howell, this
book seeks to do this by focusing on the human above all. It examines the
relational constitution of humans, and how distinct qualities of the human, to
phrase it in posthumanist parlance, are conducive to giving ‘texture’ to, or
engendering a certain ‘topology’ of, their extended relational ﬁeld (Candea
2011; Law & Lien 2012).
The central concept through which the book approaches this subject is
‘sociality’. Through examination of a broadly conceived human sociality
actualized through relations between and beyond humans, the contributions
throw light on a variety of fundamental components of the human condition
and human life – intersubjectivity, ontology, values, personhood, kinship,
rituals, politics, and so on – and how they shape the distinct ways in which
humans inhere in the world as social beings. Based on a wide range of
theoretical analyses and ethnographic material from different geographical
regions and types of societies, the authors present equally diverse arguments
and conclusions, which vary signiﬁcantly, among other ways, in terms of the
extent to which they emphasize nonhuman actors and factors, and distinctively
human qualities and prerogatives as constitutive of the human condition.
Sociality and Human Emergence
To claim that sociality may extend beyond humans to constitute a sort of
‘more-than-human sociality’ only takes us so far. By itself such a claim says
nothing about the character of that sociality; the character of the relations
between the participant entities, or the extent to which these may change; the
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processes through which this may occur; and the consequences these changes
may have for the different involvement of heterogeneous entities within it. We
need, therefore, to unpack ‘sociality’ as an analytical concept, in order to
uncover the processes through which socialities are enacted and possibly
extended in one way or another.
This book’s interest in sociality as the central concept through which to
study the human condition and its constitution through relations between and
beyond humans stems in part from a particular work of Signe Howell. In
Howell’s and Roy Willis’s introduction to their Societies at Peace, they
advanced ‘sociality, together with indigenous theories of human nature’, as
‘a framework for comparison between different societies and cultures’
(Howell and Willis 1989a: 20). Based on a notion of an innate predisposition
for sociality developed by Michael Carrithers and the psychologists Colwyn
Trevarthen and Katerina Logotheti in the same volume, they took sociality to
explain both the human capacity for creating systems of cultural meaning and
the variability of such systems, as well as a preculturally disposed ‘relational
mode’ found in all cultures. According to this understanding, sociality is
genetically encoded but ontogenetically – and culturally – developed and
completed. As Carrithers (1989: 204) put it, ‘[T]he capacities of sociality
may be in individuals, but they are completed only between them’ (italics in
the original).
This volume is not manifestly committed to this understanding of an innate
disposition to sociality and relationality, but it shares with these authors the
notion of an inherent plasticity of sociality, as being moulded into shape only
through its variable enactment in particular societies and concrete contexts of
enduring or ﬂeeting relationships, and ensembles of other factors of condition-
ing inﬂuence. Sociality is perceived as an ongoing relational process which can
take a variety of forms, and as intrinsically malleable and changeable. Of
central concern is how to account for the shifting forms that socialities take,
and the nature of their ongoing transformations and consequences for the
condition of being human.
The word ‘sociality’ has been around in the social sciences for some time
but only relatively recently acquired an emergent status as a research ﬁeld in its
own right. In part, its appeal stems from this property, or from its generalized,
unbounded and cross-analytical character more generally. To some observers,
such as Christina Toren, there are in fact important incentives to maintain this
condition, since ‘sociality pervades literally every aspect of being human’, and
treating it as a domain – as only ‘part of what we are’ – risks turning it into a
‘reiﬁed abstraction’ (Toren 2013: 46, italics added). Nevertheless, there has
been a growing tendency in recent decades in anthropology and other social as
well as natural sciences towards not only adopting the concept as part of the
scholarly vocabulary but advancing it as a key concept and distinct (though
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nonetheless highly variable) perspective to understanding either human nature
or ‘society’ (e.g. Enﬁeld and Levinson 2006; Long and Moore 2013).
Ethnographic Socialities: The Legacy of Strathern
In anthropology, this trend has been gaining force particularly since the 1980s,
in large part due to the imaginative work of Marilyn Strathern. Much subse-
quent use of the term in the discipline traces back to Strathern, either to her
comparison between Melanesian and Western sociality in the Gender of the
Gift (1988) or to her (and Toren’s) contribution to the 1989 Manchester debate
on whether society as a concept is obsolete (Ingold 1996).
In these contexts, Strathern proposed ‘sociality’ as an alternative to the
concept of society, which had turned into a liability by having become reiﬁed
as a thing, an external presence and autonomous force endowed with ‘superﬁ-
cial realism’, as well as, perhaps most detrimentally, carrying with it the
reiﬁcation of its corollary, the individual, as a separate, sovereign and pre-
constituted entity, given prior to being brought into relations. The intent of this
move was to recover the ‘sociality within’ persons (‘partible’ or ‘composite’
ones, in particular), and getting more directly at the social relationships consti-
tutive of social reality, which ‘society’ had originally been devised to expose
but gradually become woefully inept to unveil.
Deﬁning sociality as ‘the creating and maintaining of relationships’
(Strathern 1988: 13) and ‘the relational matrix which constitutes the life of
persons’ (Strathern in Ingold 1996: 64), Strathern advocated a generalized
understanding of sociality as process. Promising to resolve the false and
problematic opposition between individual and society by bringing in the
person to sociality and vice versa, it has appealed to subsequent ethnography
sharing a concern with developing a more close-up approach to how persons
and relationships are made and remade in social practice.
Certain geographical regions have notably provided an especially fertile
ground for this approach, such as, perhaps most prominently, New Guinea
itself, and Amazonia, due no doubt to the ﬂuid and non-communal character of
social relations and the pre-eminently social nature of personhood in these
regions (e.g. Fajans 1997; Bamford 1998; Overing and Passes 2000; McCal-
lum 2001; Santos-Granero 2007; Schneider 2012). Strathern (1988: 357)
credited her own use of the concept to Roy Wagner (1974), who had used it
to make sense of ﬂuid, non-group-like social formations in the New Guinea
highlands which he questioned could be called groups.
As this suggests, the Wagnerian-Strathernian lineage of sociality theory is at
odds, not only with the society concept, but also with a sociobiological
tradition which equates sociality with group-living (Alexander 1974; Wilson
1975), and philosophical theories according to which a shared we-perspective,
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